On the Efficacy of Average Weightings Predicting Joint Choices in Bilateral Negotiations with Attribute Tradeoffs

Abstract

Michael Brian Menasco

Previous research suggests negotiators demonstrate a predisposition toward weight averaging or the averaging of attribute values. One outcome is that weight averaging generates a maximizing joint choice using a Multi-Attribute Utility of joint preference or ‘utility’ over known attribute values. Thus, attribute weightings are a fixed variable in the MAU model and determine maximum joint preference over a joint negotiation set with uncorrelated attribute values. We test an alternative form in a simulated experiment predicting joint choice when there are strict trade-offs in the negotiation set and negotiators average their intrinsic weightings paramorphic to a multi -attribute model. We show that joint weights by averaging, or negotiation must be equal (a 50/50 weighing of the two attributes) to reflect maximum joint preference or utility. Consistent with prior research, results find that a relative 50/50 weighing of the two attributes is dependent both on the symmetry or asymmetry of negotiators’ preference functions for the two attributes and possible cognitive conflict inherent to negotiators intrinsic individual weightings. For instance, negotiators’ individual weightings ( .2,.8) vs (.8,.2) that result in average weights of (.5,.5) involve less cognitive conflict than negotiating weightings of ( .7,.3) vs (.1,.9) to achieve joint weights of (.5,.5). The paper concludes by summarizing the primary results of the simulation related to extant research and presents possible modeling for negotiations over three attributes of which at least two attributes are strictly tradeoffs.

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